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 This research paper examines the capacity of the EU to exercise its influence in relation to 
environmental matters beyond its Member States. More specifically, this paper identifies that EU 
law and policy has the potential to influence environmental laws and business practices in New 
Zealand. Two hypotheses are put forward: first, that the EU can use its market force in such a way 
as to influence laws in third countries such as New Zealand - that is, relatively small countries 
seeking economies of scale and for whom the EU represents a valuable market. It is suggested that 
such influence can be observed in New Zealand through a spill-over effect in product standards for 
those goods exported to the EU and sold within New Zealand. Secondly, it is argued that the EU 
overcomes legal jurisdictional limits by relentlessly pursuing the adoption of its environmental 
policies and practices outside the EU through international consensus.  
 
Keywords: business, environmental, EU, influence, international law 
 
 
Brief insight into the development of EU environmental law  
 
Unlike many other territories, the EU has been ‘markedly proactive in the 
development of environmental standards and policy, and in driving forward the level 
of environmental protection in each of the Member States.’1
 
 This environmental 
legislative framework did not, however, exist upon the formation of the EU. 
Originally construed as an economic force, the first of the Treaties that formed what 
is now known as the European Union (EU)2
                                                 
1 M. Horspool and M. Humphreys, European Union Law, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 
(5th ed,) 2008, p. 511. At the time of writing, the ‘Member States’ comprise the original six countries of 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, together with the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, Malta, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
 did not make any reference to 
2 The term ‘European Union’ replaces that of ‘European Communities’ and ‘Union’ replaces the words 
‘Community’ and ‘European Community’ throughout the EC Treaty by virtue of Treaty of Lisbon, 
which came into force on 1 December 2009 following a protracted period of negotiations to have all 27 
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environmental matters. At the risk of restating common knowledge, the EU was 
originally conceived as three ‘European Communities’ created in the post-World War 
II period through a series of founding treaties.3 This foundation was built on by 
subsequent amending treaties, the first of these being the Single European Act 1986 
which clearly made environmental policy ‘a legitimate area of activity’ of the EU. 
However, it is the second of these amending treaties which is of most significance in 
terms of the EU’s development generally. The Treaty on the European Union 1992 
concluded at Maastrict in the Netherlands created an organisational framework for 
the EU comprising three pillars. The first of these pillars consists of the founding 
treaties (as amended by the Single European Act 1986), which includes what is now 
referred to as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (FEU Treaty.) It 
is this treaty which relates to economic, social and environmental matters and is 
therefore of relevance for the purpose of this paper. The scope of the FEU Treaty is 
important in that the EU may act only if the FEU Treaty has given it power to do so.4
 
   
Article 191 FEU Treaty (ex Article 174 EC Treaty) is of particular significance in 
relation to EU environmental objectives5 and principles,6
                                                                                                                                                        
Member States ratify it. (The Treaty of Lisbon amends the EU's two core treaties, the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, the latter being renamed the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.) Therefore, with the exception of titles, quotations 
and direct reference to terminology used within those, the term ‘European Union’ or ‘EU’ will be used 
predominantly throughout this paper.  
 the latter being the subject 
3 Namely, The Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1951 (commonly 
referred to as the ‘ECSC Treaty’, but since expired July 2002), the treaties of Rome entered into in 
1957, one of which establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 1957 (commonly referred to 
as the ‘EURATOM Treaty’) and the other of which establishing the EEC 1957 (until recently, referred 
to as the ‘EC Treaty’, but now by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 
2009, to be referred to as the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of Europe.’ This Treaty, as “evolved” will be 
referred to throughout this paper as the FEU Treaty.  
4 Article 5 FEU Treaty (ex Article 5 EC Treaty.) See also E Berry and S Hargreaves, European Union 
Law, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press (2nd ed), 2007, p. 42. To impart a brief insight into 
the various sources of EU law and its correlation with the national law of the Member States, the 
principal sources of EU law are contained in the Treaties, Regulations, Directives and judgments of 
the European Court of Justices (the latter having been instrumental in the development of EU 
environmental law both prior and subsequent to the Single European Act 1986.) Generally, 
Regulations that are sufficiently clear and unconditional are directly applicable in the Member States 
(see Article 288 FEU Treaty (ex Article 249 EC Treaty.) That is, a Regulation will override the law of 
any Member State once it comes into force. Regulations have been used in areas where a uniform 
approach is necessary, for example, to regulate trade with third countries and to implement 
international agreements. However, due to the need for flexibility in the implementation of 
environmental objectives of the FEU Treaty within the Member States, the use of Regulations as a 
legislative tool is relatively uncommon. Instead, most EU environmental legislation exists in the form 
of Directives. All secondary legislation such as Directives must be based on relevant Articles of the 
FEU Treaty.  
5 The four environmental objectives to be pursued by the EU in formulating environmental policy are 
set out in Article 191(1) (ex Article 174(1) EC Treaty.)  They are: ‘preserving, protecting and improving 
the quality of the environment; protecting human health; prudent and rational utilisation of natural 
resources; and promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems.’ 
6 Article 191(2) FEU Treaty (ex Article 174(2) EC Treaty) sets out the fundamental principles on which 
environmental policy is to be based. These principles are: the principle of high level of protection, 
which is softened to some extent by the qualification ‘taking into account the diversity of situations in 
the various regions of the Community’; the prevention principle, which allows action to be taken to 
protect the environment at an early stage, rather than repairing the damage once it has occurred (for 
example, Directive 94/62 on packaging and packaging waste in respect of the reduction of overall 
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of discussion later in this paper. Article 11 of the FEU Treaty (ex Article 6 EC Treaty) 
is also of significance in that it provides for environmental protection requirements 
to be integrated into the definition and implementation of EU policies and activities 
‘in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development’ (emphasis added.) 
 
‘Sustainable development’ has been described as ‘development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.’7  Although this meaning has been the subject of scrutiny and contested 
at an international level,8 there does not appear to be any international legal 
consensus on what it might mean substantively.9  The application of ‘sustainable 




‘Community law does not have much by way of case law expressions of such a 
sustainability principle and it seems that the Article 6 EC [now Article 11 FEU 
Treaty] requirement, such as it is, rests more properly on the political level and 
is not yet a general principle that can be used to review the validity of 
Community law or policies.’11
 
 
Nevertheless, Article 11 does at least show a clear intention that environmental policy 
considerations be implemented into all policy areas and activities of the EU. 
 
EU Environmental Protection Product Standards 
 
The EU has exclusive competence to act in matters to achieve the common market, 
however, it shares competence with the Member States in relation to matters 
concerning the protection of the environment. This represents some challenges in the 
area of product standard harmonisation where measures are introduced in pursuit of 
environmental protection.12
                                                                                                                                                        
volume of packaging); the source principle, which, requires that environmental damage be rectified at 
source; the polluter pays principle; and the precautionary principle. 
  Harmonisation of product standards is of particular 
7 Report of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 
known as the Brundtland Report. Note that this definition was adopted in the New Zealand context in 
a report entitled ‘Implications of the Sustainable Development Programme of Action’ prepared for the 
New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (October 2006.) 
<http://www.landcareresearch.co.nz/publications/researchpubs/LCR_SDPOA_review_2006.pdf>, 
accessed 18 September 2010.  
8 Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 37 ILM (1998) 162 where the ICJ stated that 
‘The principle of sustainable development is… a part of modern international law by reason not only of 
its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global 
community.’ 
9S. Bell and D. McGillivray, Enviromental Law, Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press (7th ed), 
2008, p. 58. 
10 Ibid., p. 74. 
11 Horspool and Humphreys, op. cit, p. 157. 
12 The principle of subsidiarity requires that, in areas that do not fall within the EU’s exclusive 
competence, it may take action (for example, legislate) only and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action ‘cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.’ Directive 2001/101 
in relation to greenhouse gas emission trading may be a good example of this. This must be measured 
with the principle of proportionality which requires that any action by the Community not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to achieve the FEU Treaty objectives. An example of the principle of 
proportionality may be reflected in certain voluntary environmental agreements. For example, the 
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importance in relation to the free movement of goods, which is fundamental in 
achieving the common market. The EU may enact Directives13 under Article 114 FEU 
Treaty (ex Article 95 EC Treaty)14
 
 to achieve this purpose. Paragraph three of Article 
114 specifically provides that, when considering proposals for such Directives 
concerning environmental protection, the Commission is to ‘take as a base a high 
level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on 
scientific facts.’ It seems, therefore, that the EU may set minimum product standards 
which are aimed at implementing a high level of environmental protection. This, 
however, must be read in conjunction with Article 114(4). 
Article 114(4) allows a Member State to maintain or introduce stricter national 
environmental protection requirements derogating from EU harmonisation 
measures where that Member State ‘deems it necessary to introduce national 
provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the 
environment… on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising after 
the adoption of the harmonisation measure.’ Should the protective measure be based 
on FEU Treaty Articles specific to the environment, then a similar, but wider, 
provision appears in Article 193 FEU Treaty (ex Article 176 EC Treaty.) This Article 
provides that protective measures adopted by the EU in order to implement 
environmental objectives ‘shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
introducing more stringent protective measures.’ (Arguably, Article 193 provides 
Member States with a wider ability to introduce more stringent protective measures 
as there is no requirement for the Member States to show grounds of a problem 
specific to it.)  The legal basis for an EU measure is significant15 as it may be 
successfully challenged in the ECJ16
 
 if the measure is not adopted in accordance with 
the appropriate procedure and involving the appropriate institution(s).  
However, for a third country such as New Zealand the significance of the foregoing is 
that even where EU action is deemed necessary in relation to environmental matters, 
Member States may introduce or maintain stricter national provisions that derogate 
from EU common market harmonisation measures. In both cases (that is, whether 
                                                                                                                                                        
agreement between the Commission and the European car industry on the reduction of CO2 
emissions from passenger cars; [1999] O.J. L40/49. 
13 Given the fact that the Treaty Articles concerning the environment have more of a policy flavour, 
rather than containing law capable of having direct effect in the Member States, legislation is required 
to implement them. Most EU environmental legislation exists in the form of Directives. (See P S R F 
Mathijsen, A Guide to European Union Law, London : Sweet & Maxwell (9th ed, 2007), 475 where the 
writer comments that almost all of the 300 or more Community legislative acts aiming at 
environmental protection are in the form of Directives.) 
14 Note that the recently concluded FEU Treaty reversed the order of the previous Articles 94 and 95 
EC Treaty. That is, Article 114 FEU Treaty embodies Article 95 EC Treaty, while Article 115 FEU Treaty 
embodies Article 94 EC Treaty.  
15 Identifying the correct legal base for environmental measures has also been the subject of dispute 
between institutions of the EU concerning external trade policy. In Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
[2001] ECR I-9713 the Commission sought a dual legal base in Articles 191(4) (ex Article 174(4) EC 
Treaty) and 207 (ex Article 133 EC Treaty) in relation to a Protocol adopted pursuant to the 1992 UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity. It argued that, as such the EU had exclusive competence to 
negotiate on behalf of Member States. However, the ECJ upheld the Council’s view that the Protocol 
was primarily an environmental protection measure and, as such, had a single legal basis under the 
environmental provisions of the treaty. As a consequence, there was shared competence between the 
EU and the Member States. 
16 Under the doctrine of ‘attribution,’ all EU law must have a treaty basis. Bell and McGillivray, op 
cit.,p. 187:  ‘If there is no legal basis for an EC environmental Regulation or Directive, or if the 
incorrect basis has been given, then the ECJ can annul the law.’  
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the exception under Article 114(4) or Article 193 is adopted), the requirement for 
notification to the Commission avoids the potential for abuse by Member States as 
the Commission will only approve the more stringent protective measure if it is based 
on grounds of major need or on new scientific evidence. The Member State must also 
satisfy the Commission that the measures do not amount to arbitrary discrimination 
or disguised restrictions on trade within the common market.17
 
 While grounds such 
as new scientific evidence required by the Commission to support a more stringent 
measure may be relatively straightforward, it remains to be seen what would be likely 
to amount to ‘grounds of major need.’ Developments in this area may be interesting, 
as increasing consumer market demand for environmentally sound products is 
experienced.  
In relation to trade between the EU and New Zealand and in light of the increasing 
focus on environmental matters, exporters of product to the EU would therefore 
need to be mindful of the potential for a Member State to impose more stringent 
protective measures in order to promote an even higher standard of environmental 
protection than that set by the EU. This would be of particular concern if the Member 
State imposing the more stringent protective measure were to represent a significant 
market for New Zealand. For example, as will be discussed in the following section, 
the United Kingdon is a key market for New Zealand wine.18
 
 If the United Kingdom 
were to impose more stringent environmental protection measures on product 
standards for wine, this could have a significant interim effect on New Zealand’s wine 
industry. In light of this, closer examination of the value of the EU to New Zealand as 
an export market merits attention. 
EU and New Zealand Trade Related Matters 
 
It is common knowledge that the European Union currently comprises 27 countries, 
including one of New Zealand’s traditionally significant export markets, the United 
Kingdom. The EU is New Zealand’s second largest trading partner after Australia.19 
For the financial year to June 2009, New Zealand exports to the EU totalled 
approximately NZ$5.6 billion.20
 
 This figure is consistent with incremental increases 
recorded over at least the past few years – even in the face of recent world economic 
recession conditions.  
                                                 
17 Mathijsen, op cit, p.473. An example of a Member State imposing stricter environmental standards 
was seen in Commission v Denmark (Case 302/86) (known as the ‘Danish Bottles’ case.)  This case 
pre-dated Articles 191 – 193 FEU Treaty, but nevertheless demonstrates the ECJ’s sympathetic 
approach to genuine environmental protection claims (or in this case, defences) raised by Member 
States.  
18 Over one third of New Zealand wine exports to the EU went to the United Kingdom during the year 
ending June 2009. 
19  The European Union and New Zealand Joint Declaration on Relations and Cooperation, para 22. 
This joint declaration was adopted at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 21 September 2007 in Lisbon 
and is intended to ‘shape the relationship for the coming 5 years and beyond’: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/new_zealand/index_en.htm>, accessed 28 September 
2009. See also 
<http://www.delaus.ec.europa.eu/newzealand/EU_NZ_relations/tradeandeconomy.htm> , accessed 
28 September 2009.  
20 Total exports (and re-exports) to the EU to June 2009 were $5,577,918,695. This compares with 
$5,390,017,838 to June 2008 and $5,087,058,235 to June 2007. All figures retrieved from the 
Statistics New Zealand website which was recorded as having last been updated on 25 September 
2009. <http://www.stats.govt.nz/infoshare>, accessed 28 September 2009.  
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Conversely, New Zealand ranks from the EU’s perspective only as its 50th trading 
partner.21 While ‘trade is a dominant feature of the bilateral relationship’22 between 
the EU and New Zealand, such discrepancies in ranking creates the potential for 
dominance – and therefore influence – in the relationship. 23
 
 
‘The European Union is now the largest trading group in the world, accounting 
for just over 20 per cent of total global trade in goods. This gives the EU the 




Arguably, it also gives the EU capacity to play a leadership role in other matters it 
sets its mind to, such as in establishing high environmental sustainability 
standards25
 
 for goods in which it trades. Certainly, for countries such as New 
Zealand, whose economies are reliant on exports to the EU, its law and policy on 
environmental standards are not to be ignored. As the effects of EU environmental 
law and policy are only beginning to be felt in New Zealand, it may be of interest to 
examine other areas of EU regulation that have already impacted on New Zealand 
law and industry practices in order to make analogies. The EU wine industry has 
recently undergone significant law reform which has had ramifications for the wine 
industry in New Zealand. It will therefore be examined by way of example. 
New Zealand Winegrowers26 is an organisation established as the joint initiative of 
the New Zealand Grape Growers Council and the Wine Institute of New Zealand to 
represent the interests of New Zealand’s independent grapegrowers and wineries. It 
is export driven, having recently achieved a milestone of exporting $1.01 billion of 
wine in the year to 31 July 2009.27  Of these exports, over one third went to the EU,28 
with the United Kingdom being identified as a ‘key market.’29
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
  
22 The European Union and New Zealand - Political and economic Relationship with New Zealand 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/new_zealand/index_en.htm>, accessed 28 September 
2009. 
23 M. Gibbons, New Zealand and the European Union, North Shore, New Zealand, Pearson, 2008, 
pp.137 - 138: ‘New Zealand remains less obviously important to the EU than the EU is to New 
Zealand…  There should be a greater recognition in New Zealand of the importance of the EU market.’ 
24 Mathijsen, op cit.,p. 502. 
25 As discussed earlier, Article 11 FEU Treaty (ex Article 6 EC Treaty)  provides that ‘environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s 
policies and activities.’ Article 191(2) FEU Treaty requires Union policy on the environment to aim at a 
high level of protection.  
26 Established in March 2002, it is governed by a Board of Directors of 12, comprising 7 
representatives from the Institute and 5 representatives from the Council. Its function is to research, 
represent and promote the national and international interests of the New Zealand wine industry. 
27 Press statement of Philip Gregan, chief executive of the New Zealand Winegrowers  
< http://www.silobreaker.com/new-zealand-wine-exports-reach-nz1-bln-mark-
5_2262601939902529542> accessed 8 October 2009. 
28 $310,925 million of wine was exported to the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland and Germany 
in the  
year to June 2009 (representing 6% of the total exports to the EU during that period.) See New 
Zealand Winegrowers Annual Report 2009< http://www.nzwine.com/report>, accessed 8 October 
2009. 
29 Ibid, p. 6. Where the United Kingdom is identified first in the list of top three markets and working 
its way into new markets in Europe is stipulated to be part of its marketing strategy. Also at p.5: ‘New 
Zealand wine continued to out-perform in key markets. Shipments to the UK were up 22%. In that 
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The key legislation regulating the wine industry in New Zealand is the Wine Act 
2003. Its specified purpose includes to: 
 
Facilitate the entry of wine into overseas markets by providing the controls 
and mechanisms needed to give and safeguard official assurances issued for 
the purpose of enabling entry into those markets; [and] enable the setting of 
export eligibility requirements to safeguard the reputation of New Zealand 
wine in overseas markets.30
 
 
Part 2 of the Wine Act 2003 regulates wine standards and specifications that must be 
met by any wine intended for export. Legal regulatory requirements for wine 
destined for export are often referred to as overseas market access requirements or 
OMARs. Notification of such requirements is made by the Director-General pursuant 
to section 41 Wine Act 2003.31 EU Regulations with which New Zealand exporters of 
wine are required to comply are enlisted in such notifications.32
 
   
The New Zealand wine industry needs to remain current with developments in 
industry-related EU law in order for wine destined for that market to be export 
compliant. By way of example, the New Zealand Winegrowers Report of 2008 stated: 
‘The EU wine reform will change the labelling, winemaking and certification rules for 
NZ wines exported to Europe for better and for worse.’33 This statement was made in 
light of wine reforms which have recently taken place in the EU. The EU has 
undertaken drastic measures through this reform to address its ailing wine 
industry.34  Such measures were intended, among other things, to increase the 
competitiveness of the EU’s wine producers and create a wine regime that operates 
through clear, simple rules and respects the environment.35
 
  EC Regulation 
479/2008 of 29 April 2008 (in paragraph 5 of the preamble) includes the following: 
‘In the light of the experience gained it is therefore appropriate fundamentally 
to change the Community regime applying to the wine sector with a view to 
achieving the following objectives: … creating a wine regime that preserves the 
                                                                                                                                                        
market New Zealand wine is now the second largest category in the 8 – 9 [pound] price bracket, with a 
market share of more than 20%.’ 
30 Section 3 Wine Act 2003. 
31 Previously section 26A of the Wine Makers Act 1981, this Act having been repealed by section 122 
Wine Act 2003.  
32 By way of example, Wine (Export to European Union) Notice 2003 lists EC Regulation 1493/1999 
(with further reference to EC Regulations 1622/2000, 883/2001 and 753/2002 laying down rules 
implementing this Regulation.) As will be discussed, EC Regulation 1493/1999 was repealed by EC 
Regulation 479/2008 of 29 April 2008 as a result of the EU wine reform. The EU amendments were, 
however, not immediately effective  For example EC Regulation 109/2009 relating to, among other 
things, labelling requirements, came into force on 1 August 2009. The New Zealand overseas market 
access requirements for the EU are currently being reviewed. 
33 See <http://www.nzwine.com/reports>, accessed 8 October 2009. 
34 Referred to commonly as the ‘CAP Wine Reform’ (CAP, signifying Common Agricultural Policy), see 
various speeches of Mariann Fischer Boel (Member of European Commission responsible for 
agriculture and rural development), including that of 17 July 2007 to the Italian Senate < 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/493&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, accessed12 August 2009. 
35 Paragraph 5 of the preamble of EC Regulation 479/2008 of 29 April 2008 specifically includes 
among its objectives: ‘creating a wine regime that operates through clear, simple and effective rules 
that balance supply and demand.’ 
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best traditions of Community wine production… and ensuring that all 
production respects the environment.’ 
 
The New Zealand overseas market access requirements for the EU were reviewed 
with the previous Wine (Export to EU) Notice 2003 being revoked and a new OMAR 




In practice, wine makers engaged in export do not separate the wine production 
process according to the requirements of individual markets. Instead, wine will be 
produced in accordance with the strictest of requirements – commonly being those 
of the EU.37
 
 As mentioned above, the EU accounts for over one third of New 
Zealand’s wine export market. It follows therefore, that a good proportion of wine 
produced in New Zealand (where exporting is also an objective) and sold in New 
Zealand will often meet additional legal requirements of the EU. It is suggested that 
spillover effects such as this may not be uncommon in New Zealand where industries 
that are relatively small from a global perspective are seeking efficiencies and 
economies of scale.  
This is directly relevant to the wine industry in New Zealand,38 which would need to 
adhere to environmental protection measures in the production of wine imposed by 
theEU.39
 
 Fortunately, the wine industry in New Zealand appears to have anticipated 
such a shift in demand: 
 ‘The time is coming when lack of environmental sustainability will be a barrier 
to trade. It has happened in other primary production sectors and it would be 
naïve to assume that the wine industry is immune to this global trend.’40
 
  
As mentioned previously, ‘sustainable development’ is a term of significance in EU 
environmental law.41
                                                 
36 Notification of the new export requirements was made pursuant to section 41(1) Wine Act 2003 and 
was subsequently published by the New Zealand Food Safety Authority. See 
<http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/wine/all-documents/omars/eun/amendments/amendment-0/eun-wine-
omar-coversheet-admt-0.htm>, accessed 18 September 2010. See also 
<
 While the EU appears to be pursuing this within the ambit of 
http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/wine/all-documents/omars/eun/ >, accessed18 September 2010 for 
details of the new OMAR which took effect on 14 December 2009.  
37 J. P. H. Barker, Different Worlds: Law and the Changing Geographies of Wine in France and New 
Zealand (2004) Published PhD Thesis, University of Auckland, p. 304. 
<http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/1226>, accessed 8 August 2009: ‘New Zealand 
producers tend to make wines to the most demanding foreign standards (in most cases, those of the 
EU), because they do not usually have the capacity to make particular batches of wine to exploit the 
rules of each market.’    
38 As will be discussed, such requirements would also need to be permissible under GATT (including 
the TBT Agreement) or any other relevant international agreement. 
39 See T. Renton, D Manktelow and C Kingston, ‘Sustainable Winegrowing: New Zealand’s Place in the 
World,’ Wine Institute of New Zealand, 2002, p. 6 where the comment is made that: “the day may not 
be too far away when not only might your label have to comply with regulations, but what’s in the 
bottle will be affected too.’ 
40 Ibid, 3. Note also that this trend to require environmental sustainability does not only come from 
Institutes of the EU, but also from private sector bodies such as EurepGAP (a private sector body that 
sets voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products around the globe.) Large 
supermarket chains are also seen as ‘gatekeepers’ as they try to place themselves one step ahead of 
consumer demand. 
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‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs,’42
 
 the implementation of ‘sustainable 
development’ is inevitably open to different interpretations by various industries.  
Sustainable Winegrowing New Zealand (SWNZ)43 was developed to ‘provide a best 
practice model of environmental practices in the vineyard and winery, guarantee 
better quality assurance from the vineyard through to the bottle and address 
consumer concerns in matters pertaining to the environment and winegrape 
production.’44
 
 It would be hoped that such best practices also accord with the EU’s 
concept of sustainable development. 
In any event, New Zealand Winegrowers appears to be aware of the EU’s wider 
influence through international agreements. The EU’s practice of exerting influence 
over environmental policies and practices through international consensus will be 
discussed below.It is proactive in protecting trade interests through ‘mediating 
international, national and local regulatory influences.’45 Its pending activities 
include making submissions through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the 
EU’s proposed winemaking and labelling rules, and entering into discussions to 
create an internationally recognised methodology for measuring greenhouse gas 
emissions with the International Wine and Vine Organisation and the International 
Wine and Spirits Federation.46
 
 In view of the fact that both environmental law and 
international trade law are largely policy driven, engaging in such activities appears 
to be a sensible and pragmatic approach to best anticipate changes in EU 
requirements and, if at all possible, to influence such requirements in a way that best 
secures New Zealand’s trade interests. 
EU Environmental Protection Product Standards vs 
International Trade Law 
 
Negotiation and agreement is fundamental to international law. As part of this, 
international consensus on environmental protection product standards must take 
into account other international agreements as different forms of agreement have the 
potential to conflict For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(GATT),47
                                                                                                                                                        
41 See Report of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the 
Brundtland Report, op. cit, and accompanying discussion. 
 which endeavours to remove trade restrictions on goods between nations 
may conflict with restrictions imposed for environmental reasons on goods being 
42 Ibid. This commonly referred to description may be at variance with that alluded to in respect of the 
New Zealand wine industry example. See T Renton, D Manktelow and C Kingston, Sustainable 
Winegrowing: New Zealand’s Place in the World (2002) Wine Institute of New Zealand, p. 6 where 
‘sustainable’ was used in the context of environmentally sound, economically viable and socially 
responsible. 
43 SWNZ was established 14 years ago as an industry initiative. Although membership is voluntary, as 
at the time of writing, 85% of New Zealand’s producing vineyard area are processed by SWNZ member 
wineries. According to the New Zealand Winegrowers Annual Report 2009, ‘the SWNZ programme is 
well on-track to helping achieve the 100% sustainable production target over the next three years.’  
See page 17 of the report at < http://www.nzwine.com/report>, accessed 8 October 2009.  
44 Refer to the website of New Zealand Winegrowers <http://www.nzwine.com/swnz> , accessed 8 
October 2009.  
45 Barker, op cit., p. 274. 
46 New Zealand Winegrowers Annual Report 2009, op. cit., p. 9. 
47 Ratified by individual Member States and the EU. 
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imported from one country to another. In practice, the EU cannot impose 
restrictions for environmental reasons on goods being imported from third countries 
into the EU, without having regard to its obligations under GATT.48
 
  
In order to justify an environmental protection measure under GATT, the EU would 
need to satisfy a two-tier test: first, that the measure falls under at least one of the ten 
exceptions to free trade set out in Article XX of GATT; and secondly ‘the application 
of that measure must meet the requirements of the chapeau (or preamble) of Article 
XX.’49   In relation to the first requirement, there are two environmentally orientated 
exceptions under Article XX: Article XX(b) refers to where such measure is 
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’50  This Article bears some 
resemblance to Article 36 of the FEU Treaty (ex Article 30 EC Treaty) which allows 
‘derogation’ from the principle of free movement of goods within the EU under 
certain circumstances, including for the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants.51 The other exception on environmental grounds lies under Article 
XX(g) which relates ‘to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources…’  The 
WTO Appelate Body determined in US-Shrimp/Turtle52
the protection and conservation of the environment.’ Article XX(g) continues with an 
important qualification by allowing such exceptions only 
 that this Article was not 
limited to ‘mineral’ or ‘non living’ natural resources, but rather, also extended to 
living resources given that they are also susceptible to depletion, exhaustion and 
extinction. It made this determination in view of the fact that the words of this 
Article ‘were actually crafted more than 50 years ago’ and should therefore be read 
‘in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about  
‘…if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
product or consumption.’ For: 
 
‘... if no restrictions on domestically-produced like products are imposed at all, 
and all limitations are placed upon imported products alone, the measure 
cannot be accepted as primarily or even substantially designed for 
implementing conservationist goals. The measure would simply be naked 
discrimination for protecting locally-produced goods.’53
 
 
                                                 
48 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflects the general rule of international 
law that: ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty.’ 
49 P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and 
Materials, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press (2nd ed, 2008), 641. See also the 
decision of the WTO Panel in Brazil – Re-Treaded Tyres WT/DS58/AB/R para. 7.37. In that case, 
whilst Brazil used the term ‘environment’, the Panel required that it identify risks to animal or plant 
life or health specifically in terms of Article XX(b) of GATT. 
50 Article XX(b) of GATT. Note that, whilst Brazil used the term ‘environment’ in Brazil – Re-Treaded 
Tyres WT/DS332/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS332/AB/R, the WTO Panel required that it identify risks to animal or plant life or health 
specifically in terms of Article XX(b) of GATT. 
51 Article 36 FEU Treaty (ex Article 30 EC Treaty.)  See also the provisions of Article 114(6) FEU Treaty 
(ex Article 95(6) EC Treaty) where it provides that the Commission may approve or reject national 
provisions (relating to the protection of the environment) ‘after having verified whether or not they 
are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States….’ 
52 US-Shrimp/Turtle WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS58/AB/R. 
53 US – Gasoline WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 – 21. 
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At the same time, however, the WTO Appellate Body in US – Gasoline54
 
 determined 
that this element of Article XX(g) did not require that imported and domestic 
products be treated equally, but rather, it required that ‘even-handedness’ be present 
in the imposition of restrictions on imported and domestic products.  
The second requirement of the two-tier test relates to application of the permitted 
exceptions listed in Article XX of GATT;55 that is, under the chapeau of Article XX, 
the measure designed to protect the environment must not be applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
states where the same conditions prevail or amount to a disguised restriction on 
international trade. This chapeau appears to be an expression of the principle of good 
faith, the purpose and object of which is to avoid ‘abuse or illegitimate use of the 
exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.’56
 
  
Nevertheless, during the Uruguay Round of negotiations the EU (and the USA) 
instigated clarification of the right to maintain domestic environmental protection 
rules on the basis that these did not constitute disguised trade barriers.57  Two 
agreements were introduced in 1995 as a result, being the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)58 and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement.)59 These agreements 
provide guidelines and rules to regulate technical standards and regulations sought 
to be imposed by states to facilitate protection of the environment.60
 
    
Given that environmental protection requirements are to be integrated into the 
implementation of its activities,61
                                                 
54 Ibid., 19. 
 together with its ambition of being a leader in the 
environmental arena, obligations under GATT and its incidental agreements should 
not ordinarily present concern for the EU. To clarify, it seems unlikely that the EU 
would impose higher product standards for environmental grounds on a third 
country exporting goods to the EU than it imposes within its own territories. 
However, these agreements serve as a further important control to prevent 
environmental protection measures being imposed by the EU and individual 
Member States under Articles 114(4) and 193 FEU Treaty on third countries such as 
55 Article XX Chapeau of GATT 1994. 
56 US- Gasoline, op. cit,. p. 23.  
57 R D Keleman, ‘Globalizing EU Environmental Regulation,’ paper prepared for conference on Europe 
and the Management of Globalization, Princeton University, 23 February 2007, p. 5.  
<http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Kelemen.doc> accessed 5 October 2009. 
58 See Bell and McGillivray, op  cit., p.161 where it states that the SPS Agreement ‘relates to additives, 
toxins, etc in food, drinks and animal feed and is... relevant to disputes about trade in products 
containing genetically modified organisms and was central to the EC- Biotech dispute.’  EC-  Biotech 
was concerned with trade issues arising when the EU had put in place measures which effectively 
banned the importation of genetically modified organisms into the EU. Also of relevance is the EC- 
Hormones, where the EU put in place measures preventing the importation of beef containing 
artificial hormones into the EU from the United States and Canada. 
59 In light of EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products WT/DS135/R, 
adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, it would appear 
that general GATT rules still need to be considered when the TBT Agreement is involved. 
60 For example, the no-less-favourable-treatment principle in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and 
the requirement in Article 2.2 of that Agreement that technical regulations are to be no ‘more trade 
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment 
would create.’  
61 Article 11 FEU Treaty (ex Article 6 EC Treaty) . 
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New Zealand in a way that is arbitrary or that amounts to an unjustifiable 
discrimination. 
 
The EU’s Influence and its Pursuit of International 
Environmental Consensus 
 
The EU’s support for the ‘greening’ of international trade by the instigation of rules 
concerning the protection of the environment in agreements such as the TBT 
Agreement and SPS Agreement has been described as part of its ‘offensive 
management’ in globalising environmental regulation.62 Clearly law is territory 
specific.63
 
 It is therefore of interest to observe how the EU uses international 
consensus to promote wider environmental protection in the face of jurisdictional 
limits.  
It would appear that Multilateral Environmental Agreements are becoming more 
prolific. The EU has shared competence with Member States to conclude Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements by virtue of Article 191(4) FEU Treaty, which provides:  
 
“Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the 
Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with competent 
international organisations… 
The previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States’ 
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international 
agreements.” 
 
The scope of the EU’s competence to enter into environmental treaties with third 
countries most likely correlates to the objectives set out in Article 191(1) and, as 
reflected in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000, principles in Article 191(2.) In 
addition, however, this competence must also be recognised by other parties in order 
to make accession possible. To clarify the position where the EU is party, a clause 
may be included in the environmental treaty to the effect that accession is open not 
only to states, but also to ‘regional economic integration organisations.’64 Having 
said that, it is also commonplace for environmental treaties entered into by the EU to 
be ‘mixed agreements’ in that they must also be ratified by Member States. This 
‘shared competence’ is consistent with the wording under the FEU Treaty.65
 
 
With the increase in Multilateral Environmental Agreements, so too does the 
potential for conflict in approaches to environmental protection measures contained 
within Multilateral Environmental Agreements and WTO agreements such as GATT. 
While a detailed discussion of principles of international law lies outside the scope of 
this paper, it is of interest to have an overview of the general principles and recent 
challenges Multilateral Environmental Agreements might provide for such 
principles. Generally, in the event of conflict between treaty obligations where states 
are party to both instruments, international law requires that the later in time 
                                                 
62 Keleman, op cit., p. 5. 
63 Ibid, 33: ‘Art 191 EC leaves room to seek to attain extraterritorial protective objectives, though this 
power should be interpreted in accordance with principles of public international law.’ 
64 Jans and Vedder, op cit., p. 60. 
65 See S. Marsden, Strategic Environmental Assessment in International & European Law, London; 
Sterling, VA: Earthscan (2008), p. 165. 
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prevails. Applying this principle in relation to GATT raises inherent problems in 
establishing its relevant date, given that GATT has been subject to various 
subsequently agreed amendments. However, even should the date assigned to GATT 
be taken as 1994 (being the date of the last agreed amendments) then, applying the 
general international law principle that the later in time prevails, the trade related 
climate change provisions of the Kyoto Protocol (and any agreement subsequently 
reached), should prevail over those of GATT – at least in relation to environmental 
protection measures affecting trade between countries that have ratified both 
agreements. Even so, the WTO appears to have sought to limit the application of this 
principle in practice. It would appear that, arguably there might also be room for 
application of the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant (the more specific 
treaty should take priority over the general treaty) under international law. It is 
interesting to observe how such international legal principles are received by the 
WTO, especially in light of newly agreed Multinational Environmental Agreements 
such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000.  
 
Among other things, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 expressly adopts the 
precautionary principle in its Articles 1 and 10(6.)  By way of background, the 
precautionary principle is one of the environmental principles adopted by the EU in 
Article 191(2) FEU Treaty. Stated simply, the precautionary principle provides that, 
where there is risk of harmful consequences for the environment associated with an 
activity, then it is better to act before it is too late, than to delay until scientific 
evidence confirming the harmful effects is available.66  The EU endeavoured to rely 
on the precautionary principle as a rule of general or customary international law, or 
at least as a general principle of law applicable to the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement, in EC – Hormones.67 In that case, the WTO Appellate Body noted that, 
while Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement provides for the possibility of states to take 
provisional measures where scientific evidence of risk is insufficient, it also requires 
that the measure be adopted on the basis of pertinent information, that it be 
reviewed within a reasonable period of time and that it not be maintained unless the 
state seeks to obtain additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk. This last requirement indicates that the WTO does not consider 
that the need to establish the presence or absence of risk by way of scientific 
assessment is dispensed with entirely. In its report, the WTO Appellate Body 
acknowledged that ‘the status of the precautionary principle in international law 
continues to be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators 
and judges.’ While it declined to take a position on the status of the precautionary 
principle (on the basis that it didn’t consider it necessary in respect of the matter 
then before it), it held that the precautionary principle could not override certain 
provisions of the SPS Agreement.68
 
   
                                                 
66 See J. H. Jans and H. H. B. Vedder, European Environmental Law, Groningen: Europa Law Pub. 
(3rd edition), 2008, p. 38 where it is commented: ‘According to the Commission guidelines the 
precautionary principle is all about ‘risk management’, which does not mean that all risks must be 
reduced to zero. Judging what is an acceptable level of risk for society is a political responsibility.’ 
67 EC – Hormones WT/DS826/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS26/AB//R. 
68 Namely the requirements of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. See Van den Bossche, op cit, 
p. 868 where he comments that ‘[t]he effect of this ruling is to limit the applicability of the 
precautionary principle under the SPS Agreement to the situation covered by Article 5.7.’ 
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Later when the EU argued before the WTO Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products69
 
 that the precautionary principle had become a principle of 
international law, the Panel simply noted that this legal debate was ‘still ongoing.’ 
Thus the precautionary principle has not been accepted by the WTO as an 
established principle of general or customary international law.  
It is noteworthy that the EU was the ‘leading proponent’ of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 2000, which as mentioned, expressly adopts the precautionary principle in 
its Articles 1 and 10(6.) This Protocol has been taken to indicate a ‘drive [by the EU] 
to internationalize its approach’70 by having its own standard adopted at an 
international level and thereby increasing the possibility that this EU principle 
‘might withstand scrutiny before the WTO.’ Certainly, should the general principles 
of international law discussed above be applied (that is, the later treaty in time 
prevailing and the more specific treaty taking priority over the general), then the 
Cartagena Protocol could have served as an ingenious way of having an EU 
environmental principle accepted at an international level. It should be noted, 
however, that, the WTO panel severely limited the application of the Cartagena 
Protocol in the case EC – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, where it imposed a very high threshold in deciding that the 
Protocol would only be relevant if it had been ratified by all 153 WTO parties.71
 
  
The EU appears to continue to openly express an intention to extend environmental 
protection beyond the Member State territories to the ‘global commons’72 and also to 
the environments of other states.73  This is reflected in the fourth of the 
environmental policy objectives to be pursued by the EU set out in Article 191(1) FEU 
Treaty which relates to ‘promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems’ (emphasis added.)74  In addition, 
the EU’s current Action Programme75
 
 refers to the integration of the environment 
into its external policies: 
‘Internationally, it will be essential that environmental concerns are fully and 
properly integrated into all aspects of the Community’s external relations.’  
                                                 
69 EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products WT/DS291/R, adopted 21 November 2006. 
Notably, this decision was made after the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 arose. While 
acknowledging the existence of such agreements expressly or impliedly incorporating the 
precautionary principle, the Panel did not change its view. See below for further discussion on this 
point. 
70 Kelemen, op cit., p. 3.  
71 Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (2006) WT/DS291/R. 
72 The term ‘global commons’ refers to natural resources beyond the territory of any individual state 
such as the oceans and deep seabed beyond the 200-nautical –mile limit of states’ exclusive economic 
zones, the atmosphere and the ozone layer. 
73 Jans and Vedder state ‘An important part of the European environment policy is not concerned 
primarily with protecting the EU’s own environment, but the environment outside the EU.,’ op cit., p. 
32. 
74 Ibid, pp.28-29: ‘In the pre-Maastrict period, the territorial limitation of the environmental 
objectives was a matter for discussion. In other words, can the European legislature act not so much to 
protect its own environment, but to preserve the environment outside the EU, to address global and 
regional environmental problems, or even the environment of other states?  Since ‘Maastrict’ this 
problem of interpretation has largely been resolved now the fourth objective of Article 191 FEU Treaty 
(ex 174 EC Treaty) explicitly includes ‘promoting measures at international level to deal with regional 
o worldwide environmental problems.’  
75 Ibid. 
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and later: 
‘Environmental considerations should be mainstreamed as a principle in the 
EU’s external relations, and in particular: … trade policy, at the multilateral 
level and also in all regional and bilateral agreements, should be supportive of 
environmental protection. Trade, and international investment flows and 
export credits have to become more positive factors in the pursuit of 
environmental protection and sustainable development.’ 
 
Such statements show a clear intention on the part of the EU to have its 
environmental protection policies reflected as widely as possible in its relations with 
third countries. In light of the territorial limits on its legal jurisdiction, gaining the 
consensus of as many third countries as possible is of course the most effective way 
of promoting its environmental objectives. The European Economic Area (that is, 
European Free Trade Association states that were opting to remain outside the EU) 
is an example of EU environmental law operating beyond the EU by way of 
consensus.76  The more recent European Union and New Zealand Joint Declaration 
on Relations and Cooperation77 may also have culminated as a result of the EU’s 
endeavours to have its environmental protection policies recognised beyond its 
Member States. Although its legally binding force is arguable given that it is in the 
nature of ‘soft law’, this Declaration, includes among its objectives the promotion of 
‘sustainable development and the protection of the global environment including, in 
particular, the need to address the issue of climate change.’  Admittedly, its non-
specific wording and soft law nature, together with the unsuccessful culmination of 
the meeting of nations at Copenhagen in December 2009, has allowed New Zealand 
to avoid the EU’s wider influence, at least initially, in respect of issues such as 
emissions trading.78
 
  While a detailed analysis of the carbon emission schemes lies 
beyond the scope of this paper, in light of the EU’s strong support for a reduction in 
carbon emissions, a brief comparison will be made.  
The European ETS implements its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol by imposing 
a quantity cap79 based on the EU’s overall Kyoto emissions target. The European 
scheme has been described as imposing:80
                                                 
76 Horspool and Humphreys, op cit., p. 515. 
 
77 The European Union and New Zealand Joint Declaration on Relations and Cooperation, op cit., p. 6. 
78 Emissions trading was first addressed at an international level through the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1997, which was strongly supported by the 
EU. The EU also strongly encouraged further agreement surrounding carbon emission reduction at 
the meeting of nations held at Copenhagen in December 2009. José Manuel Barroso, President of the 
European Commission in his address at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Relations on 21 
September 2009 went so far as to say ‘If we don’t sort this out, it [i.e. the proposed 200 page 
agreement on emission reduction] risks becoming the longest global suicide note in history.’  See 
‘Achieving a deal on climate change: an EU view on Copenhagen Council of Foreign Relations New 
York’ <http://europa.eu.rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/416&format=H> , 
accessed 6 October 2009. See also European Commission, Combating Climate Change: The EU Leads 
the Way (2008), p. 12 where it states that the EU emission trading scheme was launched in January 
2005 as the ‘first international trading system for CO2 emissions and has become the main driver 
behind the rapid expansion in carbon trading around the world.’   
79 Ibid. European Commission, Combating Climate Change: The EU Leads the Way (2008), pp. 37 - 
38 where it confirms that: ‘[t]his cap is made up by aggregation of country-specific caps which are 
implemented by limited allocations of emissions permits under “National Allocation Plans” (NAPs), 
each of which is related to the relevant member state’s Kyoto target and subject to scrutiny and 
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‘an aggregate emissions cap for a set of key sectors, supplemented at the margin 
by a quantity-restricted loophole…. While the existence of the loophole alters 
the size of the cap, it does not eliminate the cap itself; it simply sets it at a 
higher level. The great bulk of emission reductions will still have to be carried 
out within the home country.’ 
 
While also being described as a ‘cap-and-trade’ system,81 the New Zealand ETS82 
does not in fact appear to directly cap the emissions that occur within New 
Zealand.83 Indeed, in response to questioning concerning the then Climate Change 
Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill 200984, the Minister for 
Climate Change Issues stated that ‘[i]n the period from 2008 to 2012 the 
recessionary measures taken to halve the price effect of the scheme on power and 
petrol increases will reduce the incentive to reduce emissions, so that results in 
slightly higher projected emissions for New Zealand in 2012.’85
 
   
The Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 
2009 was enacted in order to amend the Climate Change Response Act 2002. 86  
Primary motivations for the revised emissions trading scheme brought about by the 
amendment appear to be first, to align New Zealand’s scheme more closely with that 
of Australia87
                                                                                                                                                        
approval by the European Commission. See 
<
 and secondly, to ‘provide incentives for industry to reduce emissions 
http://www.sustainabilitynz.org/docs/TheCarbonChallenge.pdf>, accessed 6 October 2009. 
80 G. Bertram and S. Terry, ‘The Carbon Challenge: Response, Responsibility, and the Emissions 
Trading Scheme’ Sustainability Council of New Zealand (2008), p.37. 
81 The New Zealand government describes its scheme as a ‘mandatory cap and trade scheme that will 
cover all sectors and all greenhouse gases by 2015.’  See  
<http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/about/international-
examples.html>, accessed 18 September 2010. 
82 Introduced by virtue of the Climate Change Response Act 2002. 
83 New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, Factsheet 15 – How the New Zealand Emissions 
Trading Scheme Works <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/emissions-
factsheets/factsheet-15.html>, accessed 1 December 2009. See also ibid, pp. 33-39. See also Bertram 
and Terry, op cit., p. 37 where the New Zealand scheme is described as ‘the European loophole 
without the quantity limit’ and later at 38:’The New Zealand scheme, in stark contrast, imposes no 
caps at either national or sectoral level, and places no restriction on what proportion of any firm’s 
emissions may be covered by externally-purchased credits (Kyoto currencies).’ 
84 This legislation came into force on 8 December 2009, being the day after receiving Royal Assent.   
See also <http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/about/questions-and-
answers.html#carbon>, accessed 18 September 2010. 
85 (24 November 2009) 659 NZPD 8198 per Honorable Dr Nick Smith, Minister for Climate Change 
Issues. The Minister did continue by stating that it was expected that the legislative changes would do 
more to reduce emissions in the period 2012 to 2018 due to lesser allocation to industry and a 
stronger price signal to reduce emissions.  
86 See Cabinet Paper Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill: 
Approval for Introduction of Hon. Dr Nick Smith <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/cab-
paper-climate-change-response-moderated-emissions-trading-amendments-bill.html>, accessed 8 
December 2009 where the Minister describes the amendment as assisting in the effective functioning 
of the Act to achieve a reduction in domestic carbon emissions by 50% of the 1990 levels by 2050. The 
amendment does also provides an earlier entry date of 1 July 2010 for industries such as transport, 
energy and industrial sectors and also brings the agricultural sector entry date forward to 1 January 
2015. 
87 An underlying objective undoubtedly being to act consistently with facilitating a single economic 
market (SEM) with Australia, however, preventing ‘carbon leakage’ to Australia was also noted among 
the concerns during the Parliamentary debates of 24 November 2009 when the Climate Change 
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without encouraging an exodus overseas of industry and its skilled staff.’88 Balancing 
New Zealand’s economic interests with its environmental responsibilities has 
undoubtedly proven difficult for law makers during recessionary economic 
conditions.   The New Zealand emissions trading scheme will most likely continue to 
be the subject of much political and public debate as it is intermittently reviewed.89
 
  
However, it would appear that, on this occasion at least, Australian influences 
outweighed those of the EU in relation to New Zealand’s current carbon emissions 
trading legislation.  
The failure to achieve international agreement on carbon emissions at Copenhagen 
in December 2009 has undoubtedly delayed advancement in obtaining more 
immediate carbon reduction commitments from countries such as New Zealand. 
However, this appears to be an issue that the EU has chosen to pursue – at least 
within its Member States - in the meantime. It remains to be seen whether and how 





This paper has explored the potential of the EU, not only to lead the world in setting 
down environmental laws, but also to steer other nations in their environmental 
laws. Perhaps this has arisen due to the unique nature of the EU and its experience in 
managing the seemingly conflicting demands of economic prosperity within a 
common market while establishing and maintaining environmentally responsible 
practices: 
 
‘… the unique nature of the EC has made it a testing ground for international 
environmental cooperation. For example, the balancing of trade and 
environmental concerns in the EC is often held up as a model for integration; 
the insertion of environmental policy principles in the EC Treaty (now 
contained in Art. [191(2) FEU Treaty] also means that their legal status can now 
be explored within the EC, but contributes to the development of similar 
principles in international environmental law. In this way, there is a clear 
synergy between EC and international law and policy.’90
 
 
The EU has the potential to influence law and business practices in New Zealand in 
the environmental area through two main factors: first, backed by a strong legislative 
framework, the EU holds the potential to use its market force through market-based 
mechanisms to facilitate environmentally sound practices in third countries 
exporting to it; secondly, the EU has significant drive and availability of resources to 
achieve international consensus on environmental matters. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Response (Moderated Emissions Trading ) Amendment Bill 2009 was at committee stage. See (24 
November 2009) 659 NZPD 8039. 
88 Ibid. per Honorable Dr Nick Smith, Minister for Climate Change Issues concerning the Climate 
Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading ) Amendment Bill 2009. 
89 This Bill was criticised by members of Parliament during its second and third readings for the speed 
at which it went through Parliamentary process without, in some members view, the opportunity for 
close analytical consideration. 
90 Bell and McGillivray, op cit., p. 137. 
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EU influence on law and business practices in New Zealand exists through market-
based mechanisms, as has been observed from an examination of the New Zealand 
wine industry. Essentially, where the EU sets product requirements which must be 
observed by third countries exporting product to it and seeking economies of scale, 
then a spillover effect may result. By analogy, should the EU seek to impose product 
standards in order to achieve environmental protection, then New Zealand could well 
find itself observing them - not only in respect of product it exports to the EU, but 
also in respect of any proportion of that product destined for the New Zealand 
market, notwithstanding that New Zealand law does not specifically require such 
measures.   While it may be reassuring for third countries such as New Zealand to 
note that such measures cannot be arbitrarily imposed due to controls that exist 
through international trade agreements such as GATT, this does demonstrate how 
the EU can use its market force to indirectly influence business practices and norms, 
notwithstanding less stringent laws existing within another country.  
 
In relation to the second hypothesis, it has been shown that the EU has been almost 
relentless in its pursuit of environmental protection through international 
agreements:   
 
‘Since the late 1980s, the EU has “erected the most comprehensive and strict 
body of environmental legislation of any jurisdiction in the world” and been “a 




The potential for the EU to influence law and business practices in third countries 
has been made possible through the ‘sheer consistency’92
 
 with which the EU has 
supported, and in many cases instigated, international environmental agreements. 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000, which embraces the precautionary 
principle appearing in Article 191 of the FEU Treaty, is an example of such a 
multilateral environmental agreement.  
While the EU might not always be successful in achieving international consensus on 
environmental matters it considers important (the meeting of nations at Copenhagen 
in December 2009 concerning the reduction of global carbon emissions being an 
example), it would be naïve to deny the power of market forces as an alternative 
measure in facilitating environmental protection. Environmental concerns have 
attracted significant public sympathy in recent times. It would be hoped that opinion 
within the EU and New Zealand concerning sound business practices to protect the 
environment might be held in common. In the meantime, continued joint scientific 
research initiatives93
                                                 
91 J. R. Schmidt, ‘Why Europe Leads on Climate Change’ (2008) Survival, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2008, p. 83 
<
 would appear to be a prudent measure in facilitating 
understanding between the territories.  
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/880259_731196519_901427020.pdf>, accessed 5 October 2009 
citing from R D Keleman, ‘Globalizing EU Environmental Regulation’ paper prepared for conference 
on Europe and the Management of Globalization, 23 February 2007, Princeton University, pp.2-5,  
<http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Kelemen.doc>, accessed 5 October 2009. 
92 Keleman, op. cit., p.3. 
93 Such as the Joint EC-New Zealand Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
Agreement signed in 2008. See Europa Press Release dated 16 July 2007 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1159&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en>, accessed 30 May 2010. 
 
